Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Andreas Grunewald"'
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economics and Statistics. :1-45
We report results of two laboratory experiments and a representative survey that investigate how default effects are shaped by information asymmetries and strategic incentives. We document that defaults are more informative when the interests of defa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::147039d13cc44c14c97dade4c6e61761
https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01260
https://doi.org/10.1162/rest_a_01260
Autor:
Andreas Grunewald, Matthias Kräkel
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 131:245-263
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::940fb6961a9cadb859432b302ac3fe66
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2021.11.007
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 89:2293-2328
This article investigates how incentives and behavioural policy interventions affect individuals’ allocation of scarce cognitive resources. Based on experimental evidence, we demonstrate that incentives systematically influence individuals’ alloc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::eb1fb162f823215d44bee89d1d661346
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab087
https://doi.org/10.1093/restud/rdab087
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 30:168-202
In the last two decades, the widespread use of web-based social networks has led to a higher visibility of workers to the labor market. We theoretically and experimentally analyze the consequences of such increased labor market transparency for the e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::84e38b0196fe6392a695734d4320fedc
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12404
https://doi.org/10.1111/jems.12404
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::013a5be3df0485c9b0deddc899881c06
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4233271
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4233271
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 70:273-311
We study how policy choice and political selection are affected by the concentration of political power. In a setting with inefficient policy gambles, variations in power concentration give rise to a trade-off. On the one hand, power-concentrating in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5e5fea7c44ae58a5e79411fb6ead32c8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01210-x
This paper studies the intermediation of auto loans through auto dealers using new and comprehensive administrative data. The arrangements between auto dealers and lenders incentivize dealers to increase loan prices. We leverage details of the corres
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::43b0bebeffd828b8530b09c780e06e26
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28136
https://doi.org/10.3386/w28136
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper studies the intermediation of auto loans through auto dealers using new and comprehensive data. Lenders give auto dealers discretion to price loans. The first part of our project leverages details of the contracts between lenders and deale
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::641eeb92dd36d6a925fa1f7cf977d409
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3735703
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3735703
Autor:
Matthias Kräkel, Andreas Grunewald
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 55:91-113
This paper considers a model of informative advertising that allows firms to jam the consumers’ signals on product quality before choosing prices at a second stage. We find that the price competition at the second stage may overrule the basic insig
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::40ea36b5e48cd024124aac6fff55cb20
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijindorg.2017.09.003
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 66:901-928
Many insights regarding rank-order tournaments rest upon contestants’ behavior in symmetric equilibria. As shown by Gill and Stone (Games Econ Behav 69:346–364, 2010), however, symmetric equilibria may not exist if contestants are expectation-bas
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::281e3482b6542c1fa0b07c21ec846a0c
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1072-x
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-017-1072-x