Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 12
pro vyhledávání: '"Andrea Pawliczek"'
Publikováno v:
Review of Accounting Studies. 26:1088-1136
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual Dear CEO letter, which in recent years has called for portfoli
Autor:
Andrea Pawliczek
Publikováno v:
The Accounting Review. 96:337-364
I investigate the incentives provided by performance-vested stock awards (PVSAs) and the accuracy of ex ante PVSA valuations. In PVSAs, the number of shares awarded to the CEO varies based on how firm performance compares to target performance levels
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In this study we examine the role of disclosure and managerial reputation in firms’ ability to raise capital, by studying Special Purpose Acquisition Companies (SPACs or “blank check companies”). These firms IPO prior to having any commercial o
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We examine whether broad-based public engagement by institutional investors influences the behavior of portfolio firms. We investigate this question in the context of BlackRock’s annual “Dear CEO” letter, which in recent years has called for po
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper examines how firms use voluntary disclosures in response to information asymmetries between firms and shareholders surrounding the design and approval of executive compensation. Prior research finds that firm performance is a primary deter
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”), and this ownership structure is positively associated with voluntary disclosure. We posit that common owners want managers to take c
Autor:
Andrea Pawliczek, A. Nicole Skinner
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Investors increasingly hold stock in multiple firms that compete in the same product market (“common ownership”). Taking market share from peers no longer maximizes shareholder value under common ownership, which incentivizes managers to implemen
Autor:
Andrea Pawliczek
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
I examine how the structure of CEO compensation affects Say-on-Pay (SOP) voting and how SOP outcomes influence subsequent changes to compensation structure. I find that voting dissent decreases as the percent of performance sensitive compensation inc