Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Andrea Gallice"'
Publikováno v:
Social Media + Society, Vol 9 (2023)
We investigate the effect of social media endorsements (likes, retweets, shares) on individuals’ policy preferences. In two pre-registered online experiments ( N = 1,384), we exposed participants to non-neutral policy messages about the COVID-19 pa
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/fcb77d0a3d0e4c0191ded0fea4f8419c
Autor:
Andrea Gallice
Publikováno v:
Economics: Journal Articles (2018)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/82ace5586bfb41dc973fb173af2e501b
Autor:
Giuseppe Sorrenti, Andrea Gallice
Publikováno v:
Applied Economics Letters, 29(9), 831-834. Routledge
We exploit some specific features of a peculiar online selling mechanism, the so-called price reveal auctions, to empirically investigate how consumers’ behaviour changes in response to an item’s ‘social attributes.’ We document a significant
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d14076bf6d02aafae45dabf59db2636c
https://hdl.handle.net/11245.1/406f61d5-8ae9-4a12-976f-577b1c4ae528
https://hdl.handle.net/11245.1/406f61d5-8ae9-4a12-976f-577b1c4ae528
Autor:
Andrea Gallice, Edoardo Grillo
We investigate how concerns about social status may affect individuals?preferences for redistribution. In our model, agents are heterogeneous across two dimensions, productivity and social class, and an individual?s social status is de?ned as his rel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::623ca182479abdf0bec76e5b488875c3
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3411233
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3411233
Autor:
Edoardo Grillo, Andrea Gallice
We consider a model in which educational investments entail productivity gains, signaling power, and social status. The latter depends on the agent's relative achievement in one of three dimensions: innate skills, level of schooling, and income. We s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f13e0419b0332b7763917a664b339cf1
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3411235
http://hdl.handle.net/11577/3411235
Autor:
Ignacio Monzón, Andrea Gallice
We present a natural environment that sustains full co-operation in one-shot social dilemmas among a finite number of self-interested agents. Players sequentially decide whether to contribute to a public good. They do not know their position in the s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1f37664f7b381e618e541e51433203e4
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1638538
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1638538
Autor:
Andrea Gallice
I study bankruptcy problems under the assumption that claimants have reference-dependent preferences. I consider different specifications for claimants’ reference points and show how perceived gains and losses impact on aggregate welfare. I can thu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cf16641df97ca58e23d922c318c7643d
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1684987
http://hdl.handle.net/2318/1684987
Publikováno v:
Economics of Education Review. 75:101952
We conduct a field experiment with elementary school children to go to the roots of the gender gap in financial participation and decision-making. We study the combined effects of two treatments designed to boost the attention span of participants in
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::02fd4cffb1ebce9a943f5531652a0ab9
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.101952
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econedurev.2019.101952
Autor:
Andrea Gallice
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 80:451-462
We study a dynamic game in which players can steal parts of a homogeneous and perfectly divisible pie from each other. The effectiveness of a player’s theft is a random function which is stochastically increasing in the share of the pie the agent c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::62f12acd3c6ef63f947b9194292b4a53
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9507-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11238-015-9507-y
Autor:
Andrea Gallice
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory Bulletin. 3:53-64
The paper introduces and discusses the concept of $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ -dominance in the context of finite games in normal form. It then presents the $$\mathbf { p}_{u}$$ -dominance criterion for equilibrium selection. The $$\mathbf {p}_{u}$$ -dominan
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::239a75becdbb789fc1d5d059161b467e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-015-0069-5
https://doi.org/10.1007/s40505-015-0069-5