Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 62
pro vyhledávání: '"André Casajus"'
Autor:
André Casajus, Rodrigue Tido Takeng
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research
Annals of Operations Research, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s10479-022-04974-z⟩
Annals of Operations Research, 2022, ⟨10.1007/s10479-022-04974-z⟩
We introduce the concepts of the components’ second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) with a coalition structure (CS games) and of the components’ second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for CS ga
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ce170b3b4647546ea6562e733eefb59f
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04974-z
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-022-04974-z
Autor:
André Casajus, Michael Kramm
Publikováno v:
Operations Research Letters. 50:484-487
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ccd4382c2130b34fdcaaa197db7581d7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.07.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2022.07.003
Autor:
André Casajus
Publikováno v:
Studies in Choice and Welfare ISBN: 9783031216954
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::29a8b2125a83546651bf7bb8cf8cc2e2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_13
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-21696-1_13
Autor:
André Casajus
Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 304:212-219
We introduce the concepts of the players’ second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) and of the players’ second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for TU games. Second-order productivities are concept
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b2a4c5e7dee4648fc56fc1e88f8d5f58
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.07.036
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.07.036
Autor:
Michael Kramm, André Casajus
Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 294:224-232
An extension operator assigns to any TU game its extension, a mapping that assigns a worth to any non-negative resource vector for the players. Algaba et al. (2004) advocate the Lovasz extension (Lovasz, 1983) as a natural extension operator. This op
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::75696124d96b9d30a6e976c232f2b137
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.02.011
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2021.02.011
Autor:
André Casajus
Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics. 288:66-73
An extension operator assigns to any TU game its extension, a mapping that assigns a worth to any non-negative resource vector for the players. It satisfies three properties: linearity in the game, homogeneity of extensions, and the extension propert
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::23c1e534d08000fd2cd6af80ea7ec486
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2020.08.025
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2020.08.025
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research
Annals of Operations Research, Springer Verlag, 2021, 302 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3⟩
Annals of Operations Research, 2021, 302 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3⟩
Annals of Operations Research, Springer Verlag, 2021, 302 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3⟩
Annals of Operations Research, 2021, 302 (1), pp.23-47. ⟨10.1007/s10479-021-04005-3⟩
We relax the assumption that the grand coalition must form by imposing the axiom of Cohesive efficiency: the total payoffs that the players can share is equal to the maximal total worth generated by a coalition structure. We determine how the three m
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92814b18629e1450c4a1902c6daeea91
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03422949
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03422949
Autor:
André Casajus, Koji Yokote
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 48:979-997
The principle of differential monotonicity for cooperative games states that the differential of two players’ payoffs weakly increases whenever the differential of these players’ marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them wea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5d8d604844b7e86129caf9924c02b2ef
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00669-1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-019-00669-1
Autor:
André Casajus, Frank Huettner
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 181:275-289
The Coleman power of a collectivity to act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to that measure, we derive a new power index—the Coleman–Shapley index (CSI)—indica
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f130d7ec6b34888fc40938254c69032
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00654-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00654-y