Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Anderlini, Luca"'
Autor:
Anderlini, Luca, Kim, GaOn
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players bid to win the right to compete with N+1. The bids of the first N pla
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2409.11048
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who always cheat, while others cheat only if the cost of cheating, a decreasing function of the proportio
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.12917
Autor:
Anderlini, Luca, Kim, GaOn
We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which $N$ bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder $N+1$. When the first $N$ bidders are committed so that their bids cannot be changed in the second
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.08102
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
In European Economic Review January 2020 121
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies, 2006 Oct 01. 73(4), 849-868.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/4123250
Autor:
Anderlini, Luca, Terlizzese, Daniele
Publikováno v:
In Games and Economic Behavior March 2017 102:624-644
Autor:
Anderlini, Luca, Felli, Leonardo
Publikováno v:
Econometrica, 2001 Mar 01. 69(2), 377-411.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/2692236
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization November 2016 131 Part A:393-408
Publikováno v:
In Review of Economic Dynamics October 2014 17(4):726-738