Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 49
pro vyhledávání: '"Anat R. Admati"'
Autor:
Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
Oxford Review of Economic Policy. 37:678-689
This article responds to the question: "Capitalism: What has gone wrong, what needs to change and how to fix it" for a special volume on capitalism in Oxford Review of Economic Policy. Debates on capitalism get muddled by blind spots about essential
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6caaaf056ce2b0b7c73433fd5e030ffe
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grab021
https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grab021
Autor:
Anat R. Admati, Paul Pfleiderer
Publikováno v:
Venture Capital ISBN: 9781315235110
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::65c2227c5120cc045192a373c731c5ea
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315235110-11
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315235110-11
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 73:145-198
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::342eca8b5a906f0cb290365644f907bb
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12588
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.12588
Autor:
Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Perspectives. 31:131-150
Managerial compensation typically relies on financial yardsticks, such as profits, stock prices, and return on equity, to achieve alignment between the interests of managers and shareholders. But financialized governance may not actually work well fo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c44da629f071a2da934900dcc44313a6
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.3.131
https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.31.3.131
Autor:
Anat R. Admati, Martin Hellwig
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We take issue with claims that the funding mix of banks, which makes them fragile and crisis-prone, is efficient because it reflects special liquidity benefits of bank debt. Even aside from neglecting the systemic damage to the economy that banks’
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9cca60c231712a468774b3f73b50676e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3257957
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3257957
Autor:
Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The political economy of corporations is key to economic outcomes and social welfare in our global economy. Those who control corporations and government institutions often collude to benefit themselves at the expense of others while distorting the e
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b2efe3fa1caa8b3af6a4f1818d16b0ff
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2909183
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2909183
Autor:
Paul Pfleiderer, Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
Review of Financial Studies. 22:2645-2685
We examine whether a large shareholder can alleviate conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders through the credible threat of exit on the basis of private information. In our model, the threat of exit often reduces agency costs, but add
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e717a78f47e143d5a7e2d566eb1ffe2b
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp037
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhp037
Autor:
Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The extreme fragility of the financial system that gives rise to systemic risk and crises is rooted in the incentives of people within this system and the failure of regulation to counter these incentives. The same forces that increase systemic risk
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dbcbd05c49d5682cc45ffd6476725a67
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624064
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2624064
Autor:
Paul Pfleiderer, Anat R. Admati
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review. 45:467-498
We analyze a model where an altruistic, but possibly overconfident sender broadcasts one of a finite set of messages to rational receivers. If broadcasting is costless and the sender is rational, there is an informationally efficient equilibrium, but
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cb4043c3d7a1f656c4ba8aaa98ff8f10
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00133.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2354.2004.00133.x