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pro vyhledávání: '"Analysis of Collective Decision-Making: General"'
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Review of Economic Design, 26(3), 447-467. Springer Verlag
The Kemeny rule is one of the well studied decision rules. In this paper we show that the Kemeny rule is the only rule which is unbiased, monotone, strongly tie-breaking, strongly gradual, and weighed tournamental. We show that these conditions are l
Autor:
Hans Peters, Qianqian Kong
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 50(1), 23-38. Springer
An issue game is a combination of a monotonic simple game and an issue profile. An issue profile is a profile of linear orders on the player set, one for each issue within the set of issues: such a linear order is interpreted as the order in which th
Publikováno v:
Decision Support Systems, 152:113652. Elsevier
Decision support systems
Decision support systems
Behavioural economics has been argued to be a productive basis for decision support system (DSS) research. Whereas traditional economics assumes that individuals make decisions independently of others, behavioural economists have shown that humans te
Autor:
Patrick Huntjens
Publikováno v:
Springer Nature. Springer Nature
Springer Nature
Springer Nature
This open access book is a 2022 Nautilus Gold Medal winner in the category "World Cultures' Transformational Growth & Development". It states that the societal fault lines of our times are deeply intertwined and that they confront us with challenges
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c84c496dc2f11dcad880679bd5d1f95e
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67130-3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67130-3
Autor:
Giulia Rossello, Robin Cowan
Publikováno v:
STI 2018 Conference Proceedings
Scientometrics, 117(1), 527-562. Springer, Cham
Scientometrics, 117(1), 527-562. Springer, Cham
This paper is about the south african job market for ph.ds. Ph.d. To first job mobility involves the preferences of both the hiring institution and the candidate. Both want to make the best choice and here institutional prestige plays a crucial role.
Autor:
Christopher Kops
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 65(1), 79-97. Springer Verlag
Standard rational choice relies on the assumption that a decision maker is certain about her preferences. The psychology literature, on the other hand, provides well-established evidence that consumers are often uncertain about the true value of alte
Publikováno v:
Applied Economics Letters, 24(1), 54-57. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group
we experimentally investigate whether third-party punishment is more effective than second-party punishment to increase public goods contribution. In our experiment, third parties first played the standard public goods game and then made punishment d
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________83::eefd36e84882ad068fa3aa2dbbb68f25
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
Autor:
Bozbay, Irem, Peters, Hans
We consider an information aggregation problem where a group of voters wants to make a `yes' or `no' decision over a single issue. Voters have state-dependent common preferences, but hold possibly conflicting private information about the state in th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::b095a3f5a67274e266a727784eef9d92
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/6422bedc-943f-4b1f-a823-6513c7ffdd3a