Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Ana B. Ania"'
Autor:
Andreas Wagener, Ana B. Ania
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry. 59:1047-1065
Laboratory federalism hypothesizes that decentralization fosters innovation and learning in multijurisdictional systems, conducing to good policies. We discuss this using evolutionary stability, focusing in this paper on public funds sharing. In a mo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4750a3e45ba345c8583f36824f22586a
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12971
https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12971
Autor:
Andreas Wagener, Ana B. Ania
Publikováno v:
Journal of Urban Economics. 93:49-59
The idea of laboratory federalism provides a strong argument in favor of fiscal decentralization. It views autonomous jurisdictions in a federation as laboratories where new policies can be tested at low risk for the entire system. If successful, the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cc2cc74a408500f3878f6b0f06042ccc
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2016.03.002
Autor:
Andreas Wagener, Ana B. Ania
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 16:767-795
In view of the concept of laboratory federalism, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), adopted by the EU as a mode of governance, can be interpreted as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. Its iterative
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a5e7b47416f5e3ced9b2ae9c19839f25
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12079
https://doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12079
Autor:
Ana B. Ania
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 65:472-488
Schaffer [Schaffer, M.E., 1988. Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size. Journal of Theoretical Biololgy 132, 469–478] proposed a concept of evolutionary stability for finite-population models that has i
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e9320a29813be6c69fa8b47a89d28fd5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.12.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2005.12.002
Autor:
Ana B. Ania, Carlos Alós-Ferrer
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 26:497-516
In a (generalized) symmetric aggregative game, payoffs depend only on individual strategy and an aggregate of all strategies. Players behaving as if they were negligible would optimize taking the aggregate as given. We provide evolutionary and dynami
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::604915771fd8affed9132c40f90c379e
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-004-0474-8
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 40:153-184
The equilibrium nonexistence problem in Rothschild and Stiglitz's insurance market is reexamined in a dynamic setting. Insurance firms are boundedly rational and offer menus of insurance contracts which are periodically revised: profitable competitor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6ce98c25483bd8500304fb4322aad7e0
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00002-7
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0899-8256(02)00002-7
Autor:
Ana B. Ania, Andreas Wagener
Fiscal federalism is often hailed as an innovation procedure: successful policy experiments in one jurisdiction will, via imitation, spread through the entire system, leading to overall better policy performance. We show that such hopes set in labora
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::41c10f7e59243c609de0998f24237d84
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1402.pdf
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie1402.pdf
Autor:
Carlos Alós-Ferrer, Ana B. Ania
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 70:165-173
We study solution concepts for economic games that are resistant to local deviations. Strategy spaces are l subsets of R and local deviations are small in the Euclidean metric. We definelocal Nash equilibrium and local evolutionarily stable strategy,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::11fa97c6b1088ca44ee2a6277bdf5ee9
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00371-2
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00371-2
Autor:
Ana B. Ania, Andreas Wagener
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other fields, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-pract
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c0bc2173dbbf1e6bd9f0e1b854d92f6c
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11109/1/ania_wagener_WPM200918.pdf
https://epub.ub.uni-muenchen.de/11109/1/ania_wagener_WPM200918.pdf
Autor:
Ana B. Ania, Andreas Wagener
We interpret the Open Method of Coordination (OMC), recently adopted by the EU as a mode of governance in the area of social policy and other ¯elds, as an imitative learning dynamics of the type considered in evolutionary game theory. The best-pract
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::277ad4d4a545e85075f61a6f0759e33d
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0904.pdf
http://homepage.univie.ac.at/Papers.Econ/RePEc/vie/viennp/vie0904.pdf