Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 97
pro vyhledávání: '"Amy Hing-Ling Lau"'
Autor:
AMY HING-LING LAU1, HON-SHIANG LAU2
Publikováno v:
Journal of Accounting Research (Wiley-Blackwell). Spring78, Vol. 16 Issue 1, p80-102. 23p. 1 Chart.
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 227:471-482
We investigate two very common pricing schemes for a Stackelberg-dominant retailer: percentage-markup and dollar-markup. We show that when a dominant retailer switches from dollar to percentage markup, the channel’s “overall pie” and the retail
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Economics. 138:46-54
A manufacturer supplies a newsvendor product to a dominant retailer, who does not know the manufacturer's unit production cost k . The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p . For this increasingly prevalent but rarely analyz
Autor:
Amy Hing-Ling Lau1, Hon-Shiang Lau2
Publikováno v:
Accounting Review. Oct81, Vol. 56 Issue 4, p980. 4p.
Autor:
Amy Hing-Ling Lau1, Hon-Shiang Lau2
Publikováno v:
Accounting Review. Jan1976, Vol. 51 Issue 1, p163. 5p. 2 Charts.
Autor:
Gribbin, Donald W.1, Amy Hing-Ling Lau2
Publikováno v:
Journal of Management Accounting Research. Fall91, Vol. 3, p88-97. 10p. 1 Diagram, 3 Charts.
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 203:513-525
This paper on “resale price maintenance” (RPM) has three main parts: (i) Using a simple and parsimonious model, we show that even with only one retailer, a “supplier” or “manufacturer” (hereafter “Manu”) should impose minimum-RPM unde
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 197:266-286
Consider a dominated manufacturer (“Manu”) supplying a dominant retailer (“Reta”). Manu knows the product’s unit manufacturing cost (m) deterministically, whereas Reta knows it only in the form of an a priori subjective distribution m ˜ .
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Economics. 116:43-60
A manufacturer supplies a retailer who has private superior knowledge about three system parameters; namely, market size, market sensitivity, and her retail-processing cost. For each parameter, the manufacturer's imperfect knowledge is characterized
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 190:443-458
A dominant retailer will purchase a newsvendor-type product from a manufacturer, who incurs a unit manufacturing cost k . The expected retail demand is a function of the unit retail price p . How should the retailer design her purchase contract? For