Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 40
pro vyhledávání: '"Amil Dasgupta"'
Autor:
Amil Dasgupta, Andrea Prat
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 67-93 (2006)
What are the equilibrium features of a financial market where a sizeable proportion of traders face reputational concerns? This question is central to our understanding of financial markets, which are increasingly dominated by institutional investors
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/70b6cb8d8ec84f9a99817e63917b56c9
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 68:5557-5568
Blockholder monitoring is central to corporate governance, but blockholders large enough to exercise significant unilateral influence are rare. Mechanisms that enable moderately sized blockholders to exert collective influence are therefore important
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::67804048b5f88ee688197376a9b36f04
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4131
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4131
Autor:
Amil Dasgupta, Mike Burkart
Publikováno v:
The Review of Corporate Finance Studies. 10:44-81
We develop a dual-layered agency model to study blockholder monitoring by activist funds competing for investor flow. Competition for flow affects the manner in which activist funds govern as blockholders. In particular, funds inflate their short-ter
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f9b8787f3f4ebcb656186a03fd47089a
https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa023
https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaa023
Autor:
Amil Dasgupta, Richmond D. Mathews
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2592053f22b065ddac7797a15c865675
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4282852
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4282852
We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we prov
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c80562e6aa152586e1b19e1a49423f59
Autor:
Amil Dasgupta, Ernst G. Maug
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::239988feb5b50a98f5b38cf49daf8dbe
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952744
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3952744
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We provide a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance with three main components. First, we establish new stylized facts documenting the evolution and importance of institutional ownership. Second, we prov
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6dfb70b79c8ac7b088423b34423611f0
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682800
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3682800
This monograph provides a comprehensive overview of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance. There are three main components: 1) tracing the emergence of institutional investors as the modal concentrated owners of public firms in
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In firms with multiple blockholders governance via exit is affected by how blockholders react to each others' exit. Institutional investors, who hold the majority of equity blocks, are heterogeneous in their incentives. How do these incentives affect
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ba86ac881ff3f8815d7f0e2b4ce5ac1e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473877
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3473877
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We show that supply side effects arising from the bond holdings of open-end mutual funds affect corporate credit risk. In our model, funds exposed to flow-performance relationships are reluctant to refinance bonds of companies with poor cash flow pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9e04bbf4f004c2f81f2189e8fea739a0
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490683
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3490683