Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Allan Hernandez"'
Autor:
Andres Fioriti, Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 68:5441-5463
We introduce risk-averse bidders in a security-bid auction to analyze how the security design affects bidders’ equilibrium behavior and, as a result, the revenue and efficiency of the auction. We show that steeper securities provide more insurance
Autor:
Allan Hernandez-Chanto, Dong-Hyuk Kim
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Diego Carrasco, Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Diego Carrasco, Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Maria Munguia, Gabriella Shibata, Osvaldo Castro, Spencer Miesner, Sufi Asadi, Anthony De Leon, Allan Hernandez, Christopher Molina, Jered Bell, Madison Lytle, Kieran Wolk, Scott Roberts, Benjamin Furst, Eric Sunada, John Bellardo, Takuro Daimaru, Jim Kuo
Publikováno v:
Volume 12: Mechanics of Solids, Structures, and Fluids; Micro- and Nano- Systems Engineering and Packaging.
Metal materials are used widely in industry for piping, as they provide desirable material properties for use in harsh environments. In this work, we explore different flexible pipe joint designs that enable fluid transport in flexible heat transfer
Autor:
Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Many countries around the world use a centralized admission system for assigning thousands of students to academic programs in universities every year. That said, little is known about how changes in admission policies impact students’ welfare and
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Allan Hernandez-Chanto
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics. 20
Many countries use a centralized admission system for admitting students to universities. Typically, each student reports a ranking of his preferred colleges to a planner, and the planner allocates students to colleges according to the rules of a pre
Autor:
Andres Fioriti, Allan Hernandez-Chanto
We analyze the allocation of an indivisible project in a security-bid auction in which: (i) the allocation of the project to one bidder causes a “negative externality” to his opponents; (ii) the winner has to pay a fixed cost to implement the pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cf3e9d043cfffbc392a2336d67819ff2
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292119300807
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292119300807