Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 320
pro vyhledávání: '"Alfred R. Mele"'
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
Publikováno v:
Frontiers in Psychology, Vol 9 (2018)
This article addresses two influential lines of argument for what might be termed “scientific epiphenomenalism” about conscious intentions – the thesis that neither conscious intentions nor their physical correlates are among the causes of bodi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ad6183cf37704b528013c6a40727a013
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
Publikováno v:
Humana.Mente: Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol 5, Iss 20 (2012)
This article’s point of departure is a proto-analysis that I have suggested of entering self-deception in acquiring a belief and an associated set of jointly sufficient conditions for self-deception that I have proposed. Partly with the aim of fles
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1e4e219d775d421eb82d0e1332c3ef0b
Autor:
Alfred R Mele
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies. 180:51-71
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Value Inquiry.
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This chapter focuses on the connection between doing something freely and being able to do otherwise than one did. According to the principle of alternative possibilities for free action, a person did something freely at a time only if, at that time,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b8aeb3e0a38aec4e58ffe61b653960ad
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0003
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0003
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This chapter examines a pair of arguments for the nonexistence of free will. One of them is based on the idea that free will depends on agent causation, which is causation of an effect by an agent rather than by events. The other argument is based on
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e1dca00e52bb126c41b6e71fbe287881
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0007
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0007
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This chapter provides an overview of a possible condition that the author calls deep openness. What is needed for people to have deep openness when they make a decision is that more than one option is open to them at the time, given everything as it
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::50784483dae6ff83a042c62350d03a57
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0004
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This chapter examines two kinds of route to the conclusion that free will does not exist. The first features the device of setting the bar for free will absurdly high, and the second highlights a pair of familiar philosophical arguments—the No Free
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0ca6e9ba6e6452c48b44e6a9f10a6960
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0006
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0006
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This chapter has three main goals. The first is to develop a problem that considerations of luck pose for believers in free will who maintain that people decide freely only if their decision is undetermined at the moment they make it. The second goal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::909c7d6ac638e6063942093e6eab7d8e
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0005
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0005
Autor:
Alfred R. Mele
This introductory chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book by clarifying some of the key concepts, discussing why people care about free will, providing a preliminary sketch of the author’s own view of free will, and articulating the primary
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::889b191ab191f1570e778ca07e407831
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0001
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197574232.003.0001