Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Alexander Frug"'
Autor:
Daniel Bird, Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 17:1041-1073
We develop a framework for deriving dynamic monotonicity results in long‐term stochastic contracting problems with symmetric information. Specifically, we construct a notion of concave separable activity that encompasses many prevalent contractual
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bad62672822e673a8dc41d692a994cdb
https://doi.org/10.3982/te4842
https://doi.org/10.3982/te4842
Autor:
Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4b88fd5c8a721b3a0d52d5ee3e7384ff
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4279000
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4279000
Autor:
Alexander Frug, Daniel Bird
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 11:111-150
We study a principal-agent interaction where investments and rewards arrive stochastically over time and are privately observed by the agent. Investments (costly for the agent, beneficial for the principal) can be concealed by the agent. Rewards (ben
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d8fc12faa1bfdccc65702e5203cd286f
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170025
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20170025
Autor:
Alexander Frug, Daniel Bird
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal.
Workers are rarely assigned to perform the same task throughout their career. Instead, their assignments may change randomly over time to comply with the fluctuating needs of the organisation where they are employed. In this article, we show that thi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a2c809809ecd4a9b64fa93390b1dc74e
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa125
https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueaa125
Autor:
Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 177:594-615
Prior to advising a decision maker, the expert needs to gather some relevant information. This often takes time, and therefore, even if the expert's learning process is unobservable, the timing of advice can be informative in itself. If, in addition,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f8af6143aa25b863cad4062b5d1386e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.006
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.07.006
Autor:
Kfir Eliaz, Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
Eliaz, K & Frug, A 2018, ' Bilateral trade with strategic gradual learning ', Games and Economic Behavior, vol. 107, pp. 380-395 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.026
We propose a model of bilateral trade in which private information about the quality of an asset can be acquired only gradually over time. An asset is characterized by a vector of binary i.i.d. attributes, and its worth to a player is equal to a weig
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::30e75d0af18ec464f9a12f6bbea5555a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.026
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2017.10.026
Autor:
Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 143:118-120
Allowing for dynamic information control in Crawford and Sobel’s (1982) cheap-talk game can significantly improve the informativeness of communication. While the constructions offered in Ivanov (2014, 2015) significantly increase the amount of info
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::199084b7767d14c100af637d3e558dd9
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.003
Autor:
Alexander Frug
Publikováno v:
Alexander Frug
A discrete version of Crawford and Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model is considered. Unlike in the continuous case, limiting attention to partitional equilibria is with loss of generality. The need to consider equilibria that are non-partitional complic
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1fdf715e78cdb51bb667b8d8cb29dcb1
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561630080X
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S089982561630080X
