Zobrazeno 1 - 10 of 34 pro vyhledávání: '"Alexander Dinges"'
1
Assertion and Certainty
Autor: Alexander Dinges
Publikováno v: The Philosophical Quarterly.
Assertions have a curious relationship to certainty. On the one hand, it seems clear that we can assert many everyday propositions while not being absolutely certain about them. On the other hand, it seems odd to say things like ‘p, but I am not ab
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::488baa5291204c0e3b420fb36de41c02
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqad022
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2
On Deniability
Autor: Alexander Dinges, Julia Zakkou
Communication can be risky. Like other kinds of actions, it comes with potential costs. For instance, an utterance can be embarrassing, offensive, or downright illegal. In the face of such risks, speakers tend to act strategically and seek ‘plausib
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4394bc9b45f25f2b48b93808f8bbbd31
https://pub.uni-bielefeld.de/record/2968917
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3
Degrees of Acceptance
Autor: Alexander Dinges
Publikováno v: The Philosophical Quarterly. 72:578-594
While many authors distinguish belief from acceptance, it seems almost universally agreed that no similar distinction can be drawn between degrees of belief, or credences, and degrees of acceptance. I challenge this assumption in this paper. Acceptan
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1592cf9961812ee6ff3c6bdbb4b498f3
https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqab060
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4
Beliefs don’t simplify our reasoning, credences do
Autor: Alexander Dinges
Publikováno v: Analysis. 81:199-207
Doxastic dualists acknowledge both outright beliefs and credences, and they maintain that neither state is reducible to the other. This gives rise to the ‘Bayesian Challenge’, which is to explain why we need beliefs if we have credences already.
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5fc773208a5d0802622b070a99e6f42b
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anaa084
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6
Much at stake in knowledge
Autor: Alexander Dinges, Julia Zakkou
Publikováno v: Mind & Language. 36:729-749
Orthodoxy in the contemporary debate on knowledge ascriptions holds that the truth‐value of knowledge ascriptions is purely a matter of truth‐relevant factors. One familiar challenge to orthodoxy comes from intuitive practical factor effects. But
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7bd90192ee91e181b2aae80047c7fe54
https://doi.org/10.1111/mila.12300
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9
Knowledge and non-traditional factors: prospects for doxastic accounts
Autor: Alexander Dinges
Publikováno v: Synthese. 198:8267-8288
Knowledge ascriptions depend on so-called non-traditional factors. For instance, we become less inclined to ascribe knowledge when it’s important to be right, or once we are reminded of possible sources of error. A number of potential explanations
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d8d3fab89a8d423b1c77a071785f0441
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-020-02572-9
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