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pro vyhledávání: '"Aldaya, Alejandro Cabrera"'
Performance degradation techniques are an important complement to side-channel attacks. In this work, we propose HyperDegrade -- a combination of previous approaches and the use of simultaneous multithreading (SMT) architectures. In addition to the n
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2101.01077
Autor:
Hassan, Sohaib ul, Gridin, Iaroslav, Delgado-Lozano, Ignacio M., García, Cesar Pereida, Chi-Domínguez, Jesús-Javier, Aldaya, Alejandro Cabrera, Brumley, Billy Bob
Recent work on Side Channel Analysis (SCA) targets old, well-known vulnerabilities, even previously exploited, reported, and patched in high-profile cryptography libraries. Nevertheless, researchers continue to find and exploit the same vulnerabiliti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2008.06004
An online template attack (OTA) is a powerful technique previously used to attack elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms. This attack has only been analyzed in the realm of power consumption and EM side channels, where the signals leak relat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.05337
Autor:
García, Cesar Pereida, Hassan, Sohaib ul, Tuveri, Nicola, Gridin, Iaroslav, Aldaya, Alejandro Cabrera, Brumley, Billy Bob
We demonstrate that the format in which private keys are persisted impacts Side Channel Analysis (SCA) security. Surveying several widely deployed software libraries, we investigate the formats they support, how they parse these keys, and what runtim
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1909.01785
Autor:
Aldaya, Alejandro Cabrera1 (AUTHOR) aldaya@gmail.com, Brumley, Billy Bob2 (AUTHOR) billy.brumley@tut.fi, Sarmiento, Alejandro J. Cabrera1 (AUTHOR) alex@automatica.cujae.edu.cu, Sánchez-Solano, Santiago3 (AUTHOR) santiago@imse-cnm.csic.es
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Parallel Programming. Aug2019, Vol. 47 Issue 4, p621-640. 20p.
Publikováno v:
arXiv.org e-Print Archive
Online template attack (OTA) is a powerful technique previously used to attack elliptic curve scalar multiplication algorithms. This attack has been only analyzed in the realm of power-consumption and EM side-channels, where the signals leak about th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od________18::d888cb06024049fcdcdaae5843a45c79
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.05337
http://arxiv.org/abs/2007.05337
Publikováno v:
Journal of Cryptographic Engineering; Apr2016, Vol. 6 Issue 1, p31-48, 18p