Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Albin Erlanson"'
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8b0a8b07cb2cc3eb10d0164f37246091
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4095806
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4095806
Autor:
Andreas Kleiner, Albin Erlanson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 84:56-62
We revisit the problem of a principal allocating an indivisible good with costly verification, as it was formulated and analyzed by Ben-Porath et al. (2014). We establish, in this setting, a general equivalence between Bayesian and ex-post incentive
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e322567084a1b87b770db8f0c992f70e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.06.002
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics; 13(1), pp 338-373 (2021)
This paper considers time exchanges via a common platform (e.g., markets for exchanging time units, positions at education institutions, and tuition waivers). There are several problems associated with such markets, e.g., imbalanced outcomes, coordin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a6d425533c33343b7e698fc9967ec8e9
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a
https://lup.lub.lu.se/record/0b4acf2e-5004-452a-b8fa-63bf62088e2a
Autor:
Andreas Kleiner, Albin Erlanson
We study how a principal should optimally choose between implementing a new policy and maintaining the status quo when information relevant for the decision is privately held by agents. Agents are strategic in revealing their information; the princip
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f76c704b01238cad0ac6c8505b15adca
http://arxiv.org/abs/1910.13979
http://arxiv.org/abs/1910.13979
Autor:
Karol Flores-Szwagrzak, Albin Erlanson
Publikováno v:
Erlanson, A & Szwagrzak, K 2015, ' Strategy-Proof Assignment Of Multiple Resources ', Journal of Economic Theory, vol. 159, no. Part A, pp. 137-162 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. In the domain of multidimensional single-peaked preferences, we
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a2d7e09334ebf73ce439f04312cb84c1
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.05.016
Autor:
Albin Erlanson, Tommy Andersson
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 81:116-129
Assuming that bidders wish to acquire at most one item, this paper defines a polynomial time multi-item auction that locates the VCG prices in a finite number of iterations for any given starting prices. This auction is called the Vickrey–English
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::912bee7fab94a546d77f22ede14e623c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.001
Autor:
Albin Erlanson
Publikováno v:
Computational Economics. 43:15-31
This paper proposes an iterative sealed-bid auction for selling multiple heterogeneous items to bidders interested in buying at most one item. It generalizes the single item bisection auction (Grigorieva et al. Econ Theory, 30:107---118, 2007) to the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b4ee8b1bb931b90ef04c1b289e3e1f49
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-013-9380-0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10614-013-9380-0
Autor:
Tommy Andersson, Helga Habis, Jens Gudmundsson, Albin Erlanson, Jörgen Kratz, Jim Ingebretsen Carlson
We present a polynomial time method for identifying the maximal set in excess demand at a given payoff vector. This set can be used in “large” partnership formation problems to identify the minimum element in the set of individually rational payo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8c81580629f8a95d7907f12b7e99d2c0
http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/WP14_9.pdf
http://project.nek.lu.se/publications/workpap/papers/WP14_9.pdf
Autor:
Albin Erlanson, Karol Szwagrzak
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We examine the strategy-proof allocation of multiple divisible and indivisible resources; an application is the assignment of packages of tasks, workloads, and compensations among the members of an organization. We find that any allocation mechanism
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6b43f76ae3a5ac20a6c29d323a7b3add
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406879
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2406879