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pro vyhledávání: '"Alan Richard Baker"'
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. 88:156-163
In this paper I consider the objection that the Enhanced Indispensability Argument (EIA) is circular and hence fails to support mathematical platonism. The objection is that the explanandum in any mathematical explanation of a physical phenomenon is
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
European Journal for Philosophy of Science. 11
In this paper I present a case study of mathematical explanation in science that is new to the philosophical literature, and that arises in the context of estimating the energetic costs of running in bipedal animals. I refer to this as the Bipedal Ga
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. 66:695-699
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 193:333-350
Indispensability-based arguments for mathematical platonism are typically motivated by drawing an analogy between abstract mathematical objects and concrete scientific posits. In this paper, I argue that mathematics can sometimes help to reduce our c
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
Philosophia Mathematica. 24:422-424
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
Mind. 121:243-267
The vast majority of philosophical work on explanation has concerned itself with scientific explanation. Aside from the obvious importance of science, another factor sometimes cited in support of this partiality is that there is ‘a substantial cont
Publikováno v:
Metascience. 21:269-294
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker, Mark Colyvan
Publikováno v:
Philosophia Mathematica. 19:323-334
We discuss a recent attempt by Chris Daly and Simon Langford to do away with mathematical explanations of physical phenomena. Daly and Langford suggest that mathematics merely indexes parts of the physical world, and on this understanding of the role
Autor:
Alan Richard Baker
Publikováno v:
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews. 36:255-267
Philosophical discussion of applied mathematics has tended to focus on a cluster of related ‘problems of applicability’ that are often conflated. In this paper, I argue that several of these problems raise no significant philosophical issues. I t