Výsledky vyhledávání - "Aggregate monotonicity"

Autor: Bas Dietzenbacher

Publikováno v: Games and Economic Behavior, 127, 194-205. Elsevier Science

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse off when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained b

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fe28c2f0163bfb217e31b41de5b09cf3
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/c52bc4f6-3b2b-4078-a084-db996720d6d8

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Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

Autor: Dietzenbacher, Bas

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on which aggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalition increases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::71075c55adff3071e962a3baebb10c19
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/295f156e-91ad-4177-b61a-1dbf6949d4d0

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Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

This paper identifies the maximal domain of transferable utility games on whichaggregate monotonicity (no player is worse o when the worth of the grand coalitionincreases) and egalitarian core selection (no other core allocation can be obtained by a

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___01181::507a4dd4732e5cdabe4fcb61721340cb
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/295f156e-91ad-4177-b61a-1dbf6949d4d0

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Monotonicity and Egalitarianism (revision of CentER DP 2019-007)

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dris___00893::eecc9a5bc8a1ead1de83fadbff2054a3

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Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray’s Egalitarian Solution on the Domain of Convex Games

Autor: Francesc Llerena, Peter Sudhölter, Pedro Calleja

Publikováno v: Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudhölter, P 2021, ' Axiomatizations of Dutta-Ray's egalitarian solution on the domain of convex games ', Journal of Mathematical Economics, vol. 95, 102477 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2021.102477
Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona

We show that on the domain of convex games, Dutta-Ray’s egalitarian solution is characterized by core selection, aggregate monotonicity, and bounded richness, a new property requiring that the poorest players cannot be made richer within the core.

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c3eb964da5e186eaf68d31411b5c713e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3577521

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Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli: A Characterization Without Consistency

Autor: Francesc Llerena, Pedro Calleja, Peter Sudhölter

Publikováno v: Dipòsit Digital de la UB
Universidad de Barcelona
Calleja, P, Llerena, F & Sudholter, P 2020, ' Monotonicity and Weighted Prenucleoli : A Characterization without Consistency ', Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 1056-1068 . https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2019.1022

A solution on a set of transferable utility (TU) games satisfies strong aggregate monotonicity (SAM) if every player can improve when the grand coalition becomes richer. It satisfies equal surplus division (ESD) if the solution allows the players to

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e69ac13e3330129876889c297ee150c3
http://hdl.handle.net/2445/171456

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A reply to Ponte et al (2016) Supply chain collaboration: Some comments on the nucleolus of the beer game

Autor: David Mueller

Publikováno v: Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, Vol 11, Iss 3, Pp 528-534 (2018)
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management; 2018: Vol.: 11 Núm.: 3
UPCommons. Portal del coneixement obert de la UPC
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC)

Purpose: The aim of the paper is to pick up the result of a previously published paper in order to deepen the discussion. We analyze the solution against the background of some well-known concepts and we introduce a newer one. In doing so we would li

Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::afe928159f061c7c7a767aebce5e1b28
http://www.jiem.org/index.php/jiem/article/view/2430

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