Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 45
pro vyhledávání: '"Adib Nahiyan"'
Autor:
Farimah Farahmandi, Adib Nahiyan, Saverio Fazzari, Mark Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte, M. Sazadur Rahman, Kenneth Plaks, Fahim Rahman
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems. 26:1-27
Logic locking has emerged as a promising solution to protect integrated circuits against piracy and tampering. However, the security provided by existing logic locking techniques is often thwarted by Boolean satisfiability (SAT)-based oracle-guided a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c0ee83394a17f80ebe85ca769377b6e6
https://doi.org/10.1145/3444960
https://doi.org/10.1145/3444960
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems. 39:2152-2165
Security-critical applications on integrated circuits (ICs) are threatened by probing attacks that extract sensitive information assisted with focused ion beam (FIB)-based circuit edit. Existing countermeasures, such as active shield, analog shield,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8216e4e0064dab9b46c398e104f8e7e9
https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2019.2952133
https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2019.2952133
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems. 25:1-22
A hardware Trojan is a malicious modification to an integrated circuit (IC) made by untrusted third-party vendors, fabrication facilities, or rogue designers. Although existing hardware Trojans are designed to be stealthy, they can, in theory, be det
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::886970e1f24ba35df157d0d9b3973080
https://doi.org/10.1145/3396521
https://doi.org/10.1145/3396521
Autor:
Mark Tehranipoor, Miao He, Farimah Farahmandi, Domenic Forte, Jungmin Park, Yousef Iskander, Adib Nahiyan
Publikováno v:
ACM Transactions on Design Automation of Electronic Systems. 25:1-27
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have been proven to be effective at extracting secret keys from hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Ideally, the power side-channel leakage (PSCL) of hardware designs of a cryptographic algorithm sh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1b5c65a5b32530c6a7b173f36eb93a59
https://doi.org/10.1145/3383445
https://doi.org/10.1145/3383445
Publikováno v:
IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems. 38:1003-1016
The security of a system-on-chip (SoC) can be compromised by exploiting the vulnerabilities of the finite state machines (FSMs) in the SoC controller modules through fault injection attacks. These vulnerabilities may be unintentionally introduced by
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cfcfb41b0284d4ac69b1ddd0876f75e3
https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2018.2834396
https://doi.org/10.1109/tcad.2018.2834396
Publikováno v:
Emerging Topics in Hardware Security ISBN: 9783030644475
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have been proven to be effective at extracting secret keys from hardware implementations of cryptographic algorithms. Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate if the hardware is vulnerable to SCAs during its design an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::c000a6166882d2ca27ebf47114152c1b
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64448-2_7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64448-2_7
Autor:
Mark Tehranipoor, Adib Nahiyan, Andrew Lukefahr, Grant Skipper, Martin Swany, Adam R. Duncan, Andrew Stern, Fahim Rahman
Publikováno v:
HOST
Security-critical field programmable gate array (FPGA) designs traditionally rely on bitstream encryption and hashing to prevent bitstream modifications and provide design authentication. Recent attacks to extract bitstream encryption keys, and resea
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0899f7c7d07c32e8735509d07849d818
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2019.8741025
https://doi.org/10.1109/hst.2019.8741025
Publikováno v:
VTS
Power side-channel attacks (SCAs) have become a major concern to the security community due to their noninvasive feature, low-cost, and effectiveness in extracting secret information from hardware implementation of cryto algorithms. Therefore, it is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5225b8868cd89c7e77c76e663826beab
https://doi.org/10.1109/vts.2019.8758600
https://doi.org/10.1109/vts.2019.8758600
Publikováno v:
Computer. 49:54-61
The Design Security Rule Check (DSeRC) framework is a first step toward automating the analysis of integrated circuit design vulnerabilities. By mathematically modeling vulnerabilities at each abstraction level and associating them with metrics and r
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0031a6597ce3ab60bc70fec26316f527
https://doi.org/10.1109/mc.2016.226
https://doi.org/10.1109/mc.2016.226
Autor:
Rahul Vittal, Mark Tehranipoor, Domenic Forte, Gustavo K. Contreras, Mehdi Sadi, Adib Nahiyan
Publikováno v:
ITC
Semiconductor design houses are increasingly becoming dependent on third party vendors to procure intellectual property (IP) and meet time-to-market constraints. However, these third party IPs cannot be trusted as hardware Trojans can be maliciously
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4464867e8cb2a1b727b1d913b6de2d2d