Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 24
pro vyhledávání: '"Abderrahmane Ziad"'
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 15, Iss 2, p 7 (2024)
In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/ff102c24bef44b008f0adfa26ceeebff
In this paper, we consider a cooperative game in which two types of players co-exist: solidary and non solidary players. Solidary players are able to support by consent at least one of their weaker partners without disadvantaging non-solidary players
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::8874217e5ad5630063727d4bfc293b2b
https://crem-doc.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2015/201508.pdf
https://crem-doc.univ-rennes1.fr/wp/2015/201508.pdf
This paper analyses the tax competition mechanisms in a context of commodity trade. We show that the trade market equilibrium may restore the efficiency of the public good provision when agents from different countries have symmetric preferences. Asy
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::26e65069218ba867d607fff9197e481b
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01159532/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01159532/document
Autor:
Abderrahmane Ziad, Ahmed Doghmi
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2015, 73, pp.32-39. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73, pp.32-39. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, 2015, 73, pp.32-39. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002⟩
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73, pp.32-39. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002⟩
International audience; In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing two new properties called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. These properties form together with unanimity a new sufficient condition for a social cho
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::208d62daa16c3144e98051600826e908
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01116843
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01116843
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 54:25-30
As a justification of the core as a set of stable social states, Sengupta and Sengupta [1996. A property of the core. Games Econ. Behav. 12, 266–273] show that for any transferable utility (TU) cooperative game with non-empty core, for every imputa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::714e3b758671dd8146ba6f98cf8064a8
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.10.002
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 45:155-166
Vagueness of preferences has been formalized by using the tools of fuzzy set theory, particularly in a quantitative context. Considering fuzzy aggregation (aggregation of lists of individual fuzzy preferences into a social fuzzy preference), Barrett,
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f67a3468956e3c306e277cbd9dea4e22
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00023-4
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(03)00023-4
Autor:
Abderrahmane Ziad
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 62:307-310
Consider the class of the non-zero-sum two-person games on the unit square. If the payoff functions are continuous and satisfy a new and weaker condition than the usual conditions of concavity, or quasiconcavity, we prove that these games possess a p
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::980bd4ae6ecb6f6293b89fb76931fccc
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00246-8
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(98)00246-8
Autor:
Abderrahmane Ziad
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 29:381-387
In this paper we formulate a family of conditions called ` B k -monotonicity' that are necessary for Nash implementation, where k is a natural number that indexes a particular condition, and where the condition only becomes more restrictive as k incr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4df4ca4e8ed3400462c54028f0e20c3b
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00014-1
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4068(97)00014-1
Autor:
Abderrahmane Ziad
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 56:209-213
In a recent work, Ziad (Ziad, A., 1997. A New Necessary Condition for Nash Implementation. To appear in the Journal Of Mathematical Economics) has defined a new condition for the problem of implementation of a social choice correspondence. He has for
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ffcc0aac74dbfb99dfa7908ea5489f5f
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81902-7
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(97)81902-7
Autor:
Abderrahmane Ziad
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 20:238-249
In this paper we considern-person nonzero-sum games where the strategy spaces of players are compact subsets ofRs. The main result states that if the payoff functions are semicontinuous and strongly quasi-concave then an e-Nash equilibrium in pure st
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::606a0ca919f977dfc853ec341e37634a
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0552
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0552