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pro vyhledávání: '"Aaron Z. Zimmerman"'
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Have you ever called yourself a'pragmatist'? Have you ever wondered what that means? Aaron Zimmerman traces the origins of pragmatism to a theory of belief defended by the nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher Alexander Bain, and defends a novel ta
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship
Intellectualists argue that concern for the truth must be essential to belief if belief is to be distinguished from imagination, pretence, and acceptance for the sake of argument or inquiry. In response to these objections, the author utilizes the Ar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2454324b66c8cf27edf169733b81b08c
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0004
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship Online ISBN: 9780198809517
Have you ever called yourself a “pragmatist”? Have you ever wondered what that means? The author traces the origins of pragmatism to a theory of belief defended by the nineteenth-century Scottish philosopher Alexander Bain, and defends it in ligh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f53e5e7c7e012896543f03e3fd61d93d
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.001.0001
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.001.0001
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
The other animals fail to construct sentences, and Descartes inferred from this that they entirely lack beliefs. Contemporary intellectualists—e.g. B. Williams (1973) and D. Velleman (2000)—allow non-human animals beliefs in an “impoverished”
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9eba144bc70e657aadc6b5168c49f782
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0003
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0003
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship
The author offers a pragmatist definition of belief. To believe something at a given time is to be so disposed that you would use that information to guide those relatively attentive and self-controlled activities you might engage in at that time, wh
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e2bff59b5aad658c20953fd9dbf58cd0
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0001
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0001
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship
Those advancing formal models of rational choice, action, and judgment tend to follow F. Ramsey (1931) in defining degrees of belief in terms of a person’s willingness to risk money, happiness, and other “good stuff” on the truth of a sentence
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a959f3ea28564195d119e9c30d8c470c
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0002
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0002
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Oxford Scholarship
To conclude the discussion, the author turns to James’s defense of the will to believe. Philosophers have tended to focus on the normative question of whether it is ever OK to adopt beliefs for pragmatic reasons. The “evidentialists” are prepar
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1683902f6fc39b36fa30314c56d2f9c4
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0006
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198809517.003.0006
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Quarterly. 54:435-438
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6fe511030d12188c5b5bdf1771dbc203
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00363.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00363.x
Autor:
Aaron Z. Zimmerman
Publikováno v:
Ars Disputandi. 6:17-19
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::eb6e9c1619453554345f857a0163e1bf
https://doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819900
https://doi.org/10.1080/15665399.2006.10819900