Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"Aaron Kolb"'
Autor:
Aaron Kolb, Erik Madsen
Publikováno v:
The Review of Economic Studies. 90:912-947
We study how an organization should dynamically screen an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times underminin
Autor:
Sebastian Gryglewicz, Aaron Kolb
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, 17(2), 539-559. Wiley-Blackwell
We study dynamic signaling in a game of stochastic stakes. Each period, a privately informed agent of binary type chooses whether to continue receiving a return that is an increasing function of both her reputation and an exogenous public stakes vari
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:373-419
We investigate competition in a delegation framework, with a coarsely informed principal. Two imperfectly informed and biased experts simultaneously propose action choices. A principal with a diffuse prior, and only being able to ordinally compare th
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:29-69
We study a continuous-time organization design problem. Each member's output is an imperfect signal of his underlying choice of effort, and each member's utility from remaining in the organization is endogenous to the output of other agents. Monetary
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Aaron Kolb
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 183:344-383
I study hidden investment in quality in a dynamic persuasion game. A seller, such as a project manager or startup company, controls an asset and wants to convince a potential buyer, such as an acquiring company or a regulator, that it has high qualit
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We develop and test a theory of blind disclosure. A sender chooses whether to disclose information based on a preliminary, private signal. In the unique equilibrium, contrary to the literature’s canonical unraveling result, senders disclose only if
Autor:
Aaron Kolb, Gonzalo Cisternas
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic pla
Autor:
Aaron Kolb, Erik Kloppenborg Madsen
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study how an organization dynamically screens an agent of uncertain loyalty whom it suspects of committing damaging acts of undermining. The organization controls the stakes of the relationship, while the agent strategically times undermining, whi
Autor:
Aaron Kolb, Vincent Conitzer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 189:105094
We analyze cheap talk warnings about a strategic adversary, with applications to cybersecurity and national security. Each period an expert receives a noisy private signal about whether an attack by the adversary is feasible. The expert wants to warn