Zobrazeno 1 - 9
of 9
pro vyhledávání: '"Aadhaar Chaturvedi"'
Autor:
Aadhaar Chaturvedi
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 32:434-448
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::50fab725eb1b4f958737123429be9946
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13880
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13880
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Economics. 252
Joint purchasing (JP) agreements are negotiated amongst competing OEMs to enable them to obtain rebates from their supplier(s). The iterative interactions involved in reaching such JP agreements result in disclosure of private information that the OE
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bd31f3148dcf304017ace7e8865b076a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108576
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2022.108576
Autor:
Aadhaar Chaturvedi
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 30:3073-3093
Supplier non‐performance is an ever present problem for an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) buyer and past survey‐based research has shown that increasing supplier competition adversely affects their performance. Using a reverse auction sett
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::26fdd5d7dd0c07026123c1deeeda5149
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13418
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.13418
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 65:71-89
We investigate procurement in a setting in which the buyer is bound by sourcing rules. Sourcing rules may limit the minimum and maximum amounts of business that can be awarded to a single supplier or dictate the minimum number of suppliers who are aw
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e0e21abb0e6a3ca5178c5c2ddca0ae84
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2932
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2017.2932
Autor:
Gilles Merckx, Aadhaar Chaturvedi
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Production Economics. 227:107652
In dynamic markets where cost of components changes fast, buyers typically auction off regular short-term contracts to fully leverage supplier competition in each period to continuously source from the lowest-cost supplier. However, too much competit
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::33088e60e544164f634c58833a760cd7
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107652
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2020.107652
Publikováno v:
Production and Operations Management. 25(1):77-95
Firms mitigate uncertainty in demand and supply by carrying safety stock, planning for excess capacity and diversifying supply sources. In this study, we provide a framework to jointly optimize these three levers in a periodic review infinite horizon
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d214ebcca053aeddf01aaea59c25cc4e
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12406
https://doi.org/10.1111/poms.12406
Autor:
Aadhaar Chaturvedi
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 247:987-995
In this paper we study two reverse auction formats in a single period setting, the sealed pay-as-bid and the open format, when suppliers are capacity constrained. In the pay-as-bid format we characterize the asymmetric bidding equilibrium for the cas
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::35f69a7fd535d61bc78aa64344d3a927
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2015.06.039
Publikováno v:
Management Science
To stay abreast of current supply-market pricing, it is common for procurement managers to frequently organize auctions among a pool of qualified suppliers (the supply base). Sole awards can alienate losing suppliers and cause them to defect from the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::62c2b8f3166f5298da7474c0a4af6fdf
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1835
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2013.1835
Publikováno v:
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management. 13:227-243
This paper analyzes optimal auction design when delivery of supply is uncertain. We consider a buyer facing multiple potential suppliers, each having an associated (exogenous) reliability that quantifies its risk of supply failure. We design optimal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3feb9bb293d02b407ddad84ede9469d5
https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1100.0319
https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.1100.0319