Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 117
pro vyhledávání: '"ARKADI PREDTETCHINSKI"'
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 73(2-3), 695-719. Springer Verlag
We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::edbfe2e33487c708a9ccb75534b3b8f0
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01201-y
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01201-y
Publikováno v:
Journal of Symbolic Logic, 87(4), 1459-1473. Association for Symbolic Logic
We consider a real-valued function f defined on the set of infinite branches X of a countably branching pruned tree T. The function f is said to be a limsup function if there is a function $u \colon T \to \mathbb {R}$ such that $f(x) = \limsup _{t \t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::55b884bbd88165079309c749033c4bd8
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/47d6e08e-8a42-4811-b38f-c451b043cb23
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/47d6e08e-8a42-4811-b38f-c451b043cb23
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 50(2), 559-579. Springer
Dubins and Savage (How to gamble if you must: inequalities for stochastic processes, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1965) found an optimal strategy for limsup gambling problems in which a player has at most two choices at every state x at most one of which c
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a457ca4f924d6c4b6171d0fd1e24828d
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00762-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-021-00762-4
Autor:
János Flesch, Arkadi Predtetchinski
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research. 287(2):683-699
Considered are perfect information games with a Borel measurable payoff function that is parameterized by points of a Polish space. The existence domain of such a parameterized game is the set of parameters for which the game admits a subgame perfect
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6a2948893172374f42bc7c1652ee4641
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/31667f1a-2729-4acf-8de4-9c0346478074
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/31667f1a-2729-4acf-8de4-9c0346478074
Publikováno v:
Ark. Mat. 58, no. 2 (2020), 243-266
Arkiv for Matematik, 58(2), 243-266. Springer
Arkiv for Matematik, 58(2), 243-266. Springer
We introduce the so--called doubling metric on the collection of non--empty bounded open subsets of a metric space. Given a subset $U$ of a metric space $X$, the predecessor $U_{*}$ of $U$ is defined by doubling the radii of all open balls contained
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7c15b93efa935cb43cce1014d210132c
https://doi.org/10.4310/arkiv.2020.v58.n2.a2
https://doi.org/10.4310/arkiv.2020.v58.n2.a2
Publikováno v:
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 119(11):e2105867119. National Academy of Sciences
Significance Nash equilibrium, of central importance in strategic game theory, exists in all finite games. Here we prove that it exists also in all infinitely repeated games, with a finite or countably infinite set of players, in which the payoff fun
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3ba2a659891c2989f4c1970649361341
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/bfd0f94a-d1a2-4994-b30f-a1efb3dce321
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/bfd0f94a-d1a2-4994-b30f-a1efb3dce321
Publikováno v:
Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 82(2), 499-516. Springer Verlag
A positive zero-sum stochastic game with countable state and action spaces is shown to have a value if, at every state, at least one player has a finite action space. The proof uses transfinite algorithms to calculate the upper and lower values of th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3d0dcbc73a709afdaadad07259d67e48
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/ee638405-9fea-4374-8d60-0d2f90e08a09
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/ee638405-9fea-4374-8d60-0d2f90e08a09
Publikováno v:
Discrete Applied Mathematics, 251, 40-56. Elsevier
We consider two-player zero-sum stochastic games with the limsup and with the liminf payoffs. For the limsup payoff, we prove that the existence of an optimal strategy implies the existence of a stationary optimal strategy. Our construction does not
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::aebfd5d1cc2014ac2a286ecdb89ec896
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.05.038
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.dam.2018.05.038
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Probability, 55(3), 728-741. Cambridge University Press
We consider positive zero-sum stochastic games with countable state and action spaces. For each player, we provide a characterization of those strategies that are optimal in every subgame. These characterizations are used to prove two simplification
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fa5e48b658c3297aee255fb5a5bfeabe
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/9b77a144-88f8-488f-b1f5-b870c6fffe9e
https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/en/publications/9b77a144-88f8-488f-b1f5-b870c6fffe9e
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 76(May 2018), 101-112. Elsevier Science
We study the division of a surplus under majoritarian bargaining in the three-person case. In a stationary equilibrium as derived by Baron and Ferejohn (1989), the proposer offers one third times the discount factor of the surplus to a second player
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::654a79a008cdf33ac5eb3cac0014f5f5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2018.03.007