Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"A, Sinanoglu"'
Autor:
Bhandari, Jitendra, Chowdhury, Animesh Basak, Nabeel, Mohammed, Sinanoglu, Ozgur, Garg, Siddharth, Karri, Ramesh, Knechtel, Johann
Power side-channel (PSC) analysis is pivotal for securing cryptographic hardware. Prior art focused on securing gate-level netlists obtained as-is from chip design automation, neglecting all the complexities and potential side-effects for security ar
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.19549
Chip design is about to be revolutionized by the integration of large language, multimodal, and circuit models (collectively LxMs). While exploring this exciting frontier with tremendous potential, the community must also carefully consider the relat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07061
Autor:
Wang, Fangzhou, Wang, Qijing, Alrahis, Lilas, Fu, Bangqi, Jiang, Shui, Zhang, Xiaopeng, Sinanoglu, Ozgur, Ho, Tsung-Yi, Young, Evangeline F. Y., Knechtel, Johann
Due to cost benefits, supply chains of integrated circuits (ICs) are largely outsourced nowadays. However, passing ICs through various third-party providers gives rise to many security threats, like piracy of IC intellectual property or insertion of
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05590
Graph neural network-based network intrusion detection systems have recently demonstrated state-of-the-art performance on benchmark datasets. Nevertheless, these methods suffer from a reliance on target encoding for data pre-processing, limiting wide
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.18986
Autor:
Bhandari, Jitendra, Nabeel, Mohammed, Mankali, Likhitha, Sinanoglu, Ozgur, Karri, Ramesh, Knechtel, Johann
This paper presents a novel defense strategy against static power side-channel attacks (PSCAs), a critical threat to cryptographic security. Our method is based on (1) carefully tuning high-Vth versus low-Vth cell selection during synthesis, accounti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.03196
Logic locking protects the integrity of hardware designs throughout the integrated circuit supply chain. However, recent machine learning (ML)-based attacks have challenged its fundamental security, initiating the requirement for the design of learni
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.01840
We propose FPGA-Patch, the first-of-its-kind defense that leverages automated program repair concepts to thwart power side-channel attacks on cloud FPGAs. FPGA-Patch generates isofunctional variants of the target hardware by injecting faults and find
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2304.02510
Autor:
Alrahis, Lilas, Sinanoglu, Ozgur
The participation of third-party entities in the globalized semiconductor supply chain introduces potential security vulnerabilities, such as intellectual property piracy and hardware Trojan (HT) insertion. Graph neural networks (GNNs) have been empl
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.16690
Autor:
Alrahis, Lilas, Patnaik, Satwik, Hanif, Muhammad Abdullah, Shafique, Muhammad, Sinanoglu, Ozgur
Graph neural networks (GNNs) have shown great success in detecting intellectual property (IP) piracy and hardware Trojans (HTs). However, the machine learning community has demonstrated that GNNs are susceptible to data poisoning attacks, which resul
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.14009
Extracting the architecture of layers of a given deep neural network (DNN) through hardware-based side channels allows adversaries to steal its intellectual property and even launch powerful adversarial attacks on the target system. In this work, we
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.06746