Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 780
pro vyhledávání: '"A, Perchet"'
We study the problem of matching markets with ties, where one side of the market does not necessarily have strict preferences over members at its other side. For example, workers do not always have strict preferences over jobs, students can give the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.03270
Publikováno v:
ICASSP 2024 - 2024 IEEE International Conference on Acoustics, Speech and Signal Processing (ICASSP), 2024, pp.7435-7439
In the strategic multi-armed bandit setting, when arms possess perfect information about the player's behavior, they can establish an equilibrium where: 1. they retain almost all of their value, 2. they leave the player with a substantial (linear) re
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.17101
We explore a novel variant of the classical prophet inequality problem, where the values of a sequence of items are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution, and an online decision maker must select one item irrevocably. We establish that the competitive
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2408.07616
We consider sequences of finite weighted random graphs that converge locally to unimodular i.i.d. weighted random trees. When the weights are atomless, we prove that the matchings of maximal weight converge locally to a matching on the limiting tree.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.03141
Autor:
Jain, Atulya, Perchet, Vianney
How should an expert send forecasts to maximize her utility subject to passing a calibration test? We consider a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision maker. The decision maker uses a calibration test based on past
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.15680
In contextual dynamic pricing, a seller sequentially prices goods based on contextual information. Buyers will purchase products only if the prices are below their valuations. The goal of the seller is to design a pricing strategy that collects as mu
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.11316
Prophet inequalities are fundamental optimal stopping problems, where a decision-maker observes sequentially items with values sampled independently from known distributions, and must decide at each new observation to either stop and gain the current
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2406.06805
Bilateral trade models the problem of facilitating trades between a seller and a buyer having private valuations for the item being sold. In the online version of the problem, the learner faces a new seller and buyer at each time step, and has to pos
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.18183
Inspired by sequential budgeted allocation problems, we study the online matching problem with budget refills. In this context, we consider an online bipartite graph G=(U,V,E), where the nodes in $V$ are discovered sequentially and nodes in $U$ are k
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.09920
Autor:
Benomar, Ziyad, Perchet, Vianney
The non-clairvoyant scheduling problem has gained new interest within learning-augmented algorithms, where the decision-maker is equipped with predictions without any quality guarantees. In practical settings, access to predictions may be reduced to
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.01013