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Autor:
Nathan W. Monroe
Publikováno v:
Monroe, Nathan W.(2010). The policy impact of unified government: evidence from 2000 to 2002. Public Choice, 142(1), pp 111-124. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9477-0. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3wn9f8mv
Do the outcomes of government action differ between periods of unified and divided government? Using “event study” methodology, this articles addresses the question by looking at sudden shifts between divided and unified government—Bush v. Gore
Autor:
Lars-H. R. Siemers, Axel Dreher
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 140:245-265
We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. Corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenu
Publikováno v:
Adams, James; Brunell, Thomas L.; Grofman, Bernard; & Merrill, Samuel. (2010). Why candidate divergence should be expected to be just as great (or even greater) in competitive seats as in non-competitive ones. Public Choice, 145(3), pp 417-433. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9573-1. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1xb8s5rv
Basic Downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two-candidate elections. Common journalistic wisdom, moreover, leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5380b335920013e9855bfc48b2710c00
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1xb8s5rv
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/1xb8s5rv
Autor:
Toshihiro Ihori, Martin C. McGuire
Publikováno v:
Ihori, Toshihiro; & McGuire, Martin C.(2010). National self-insurance and self-protection against adversity: bureaucratic management of security and moral hazard. Economics of Governance, 11(2), pp 103-122. doi: 10.1007/s10101-010-0073-z. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5jb7v8nv
This paper extends existing analyses of self-insurance and self-protection—distinctions first made by Ehrlich and Becker (J Polit Econ 80:623–648, 1972)—that countries may implement at a national level in pursuit of their security. We show that
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::56b2215e8f66d11e63f6e5cb95a6e221
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5jb7v8nv
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5jb7v8nv
Autor:
Michael McBride
Publikováno v:
McBride, Michael. (2010). Threshold uncertainty in discrete public good games: an experimental study. Economics of Governance, 11(1), pp 77-99. doi: 10.1007/s10101-009-0069-8. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/49p8c2jv
A discrete public good is provided when total contributions equal or exceed the contribution threshold. Recent theoretical work shows that an increase in threshold uncertainty will increase (decrease) equilibrium contributions when the public good va
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::07f8bc9481a2b3a8ad10a47eecf35366
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/49p8c2jv
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/49p8c2jv
Autor:
Christina J. Schneider
Publikováno v:
Schneider, Christina J.(2010). Fighting with one hand tied behind the back: political budget cycles in the West German states. Public Choice, 142(1), pp 125-150. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9480-5. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6rq810s1
Theories of political budget cycles have been contested because scholars find that incumbents can manipulate deficits in the pre-election period only if fiscal transparency is low. I argue that these findings do not generally rule out the possibility
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a7aeaa579e060f03b5f7fe3c9c068215
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6rq810s1
http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6rq810s1
Autor:
Axel Dreher, Friedrich Schneider
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 144(1-2):215-238
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses ar
Autor:
David Zetland
Publikováno v:
Zetland, David. (2010). Save the poor, shoot some bankers. Public Choice, 145(3), pp 331-337. doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9708-4. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5db67751
Bilateral or multilateral organizations control about 90% of official overseas development assistance (ODA), much of which is wasted. This note traces aid failure to the daisy chain of principal-agent-beneficiary relationships linking rich donors to
Autor:
Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 149(3-4):337-363
This article investigates empirically whether, and in what ways, donors in the Development Assistance Committee respond to transnational terrorist incidents and the onset of the War on Terror by changing aid effort and aid allocation. First, an analy
Autor:
Robert T. Deacon
Publikováno v:
Deacon, Robert T.(2009). Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy. Public Choice, 139(1), pp 241-262. doi: 10.1007/s11127-008-9391-x. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7f74s0nz
The allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers is modeled under different systems of government. The relatively even distribution of political power among groups in a democracy favors spending on nonexclusive public goods.