Zobrazeno 1 - 7
of 7
pro vyhledávání: '"Tacchetti, Andrea"'
Autor:
Koster, Raphael, Pîslar, Miruna, Tacchetti, Andrea, Balaguer, Jan, Liu, Leqi, Elie, Romuald, Hauser, Oliver P., Tuyls, Karl, Botvinick, Matt, Summerfield, Christopher
A canonical social dilemma arises when finite resources are allocated to a group of people, who can choose to either reciprocate with interest, or keep the proceeds for themselves. What resource allocation mechanisms will encourage levels of reciproc
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15059
Teacher-Student Curriculum Learning (TSCL) is a curriculum learning framework that draws inspiration from human cultural transmission and learning. It involves a teacher algorithm shaping the learning process of a learner algorithm by exposing it to
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.03084
Autor:
Goktas, Denizalp, Parkes, David C., Gemp, Ian, Marris, Luke, Piliouras, Georgios, Elie, Romuald, Lever, Guy, Tacchetti, Andrea
We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE)
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2302.06607
Solution concepts such as Nash Equilibria, Correlated Equilibria, and Coarse Correlated Equilibria are useful components for many multiagent machine learning algorithms. Unfortunately, solving a normal-form game could take prohibitive or non-determin
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2210.09257
Autor:
Gemp, Ian, Savani, Rahul, Lanctot, Marc, Bachrach, Yoram, Anthony, Thomas, Everett, Richard, Tacchetti, Andrea, Eccles, Tom, Kramár, János
Nash equilibrium is a central concept in game theory. Several Nash solvers exist, yet none scale to normal-form games with many actions and many players, especially those with payoff tensors too big to be stored in memory. In this work, we propose an
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2106.01285
Autor:
Gemp, Ian, McKee, Kevin R., Everett, Richard, Duéñez-Guzmán, Edgar A., Bachrach, Yoram, Balduzzi, David, Tacchetti, Andrea
In multiagent systems, the complex interaction of fixed incentives can lead agents to outcomes that are poor (inefficient) not only for the group, but also for each individual. Price of anarchy is a technical, game-theoretic definition that quantifie
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2010.00575
Autor:
Anthony, Thomas, Eccles, Tom, Tacchetti, Andrea, Kramár, János, Gemp, Ian, Hudson, Thomas C., Porcel, Nicolas, Lanctot, Marc, Pérolat, Julien, Everett, Richard, Werpachowski, Roman, Singh, Satinder, Graepel, Thore, Bachrach, Yoram
Recent advances in deep reinforcement learning (RL) have led to considerable progress in many 2-player zero-sum games, such as Go, Poker and Starcraft. The purely adversarial nature of such games allows for conceptually simple and principled applicat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2006.04635