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Publikováno v:
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 72(1), 185-220. Oxford University Press
The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 72(1), 185-220. Oxford University Press
The British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 72(1), 185-220. Oxford University Press
Some naturalistic philosophers of mind subscribing to the predictive processing theory of mind have adopted a realist attitude towards the results of Bayesian cognitive science. In this article, we argue that this realist attitude is unwarranted. The
Autor:
Katie Robertson Robertson
Publikováno v:
PubMed Central
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The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
UnpayWall
Microsoft Academic Graph
Sygma
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science
While the fundamental laws of physics are time-reversal invariant, most macroscopic processes are irreversible. Given that the fundamental laws are taken to underpin all other processes, how can the fundamental time-symmetry be reconciled with the as