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Autor:
Nathan W. Monroe
Publikováno v:
Monroe, Nathan W.(2010). The policy impact of unified government: evidence from 2000 to 2002. Public Choice, 142(1), pp 111-124. doi: 10.1007/s11127-009-9477-0. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3wn9f8mv
Do the outcomes of government action differ between periods of unified and divided government? Using “event study” methodology, this articles addresses the question by looking at sudden shifts between divided and unified government—Bush v. Gore
Autor:
Lars-H. R. Siemers, Axel Dreher
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 140:245-265
We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corruption and capital account restrictions. Corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenu
Autor:
Axel Dreher, Friedrich Schneider
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 144(1-2):215-238
This paper analyzes the influence of the shadow economy on corruption and vice versa. We hypothesize that corruption and the shadow economy are substitutes in high income countries while they are complements in low income countries. The hypotheses ar
Autor:
David Zetland
Publikováno v:
Zetland, David. (2010). Save the poor, shoot some bankers. Public Choice, 145(3), pp 331-337. doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9708-4. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5db67751
Bilateral or multilateral organizations control about 90% of official overseas development assistance (ODA), much of which is wasted. This note traces aid failure to the daisy chain of principal-agent-beneficiary relationships linking rich donors to
Autor:
Axel Dreher, Andreas Fuchs
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 149(3-4):337-363
This article investigates empirically whether, and in what ways, donors in the Development Assistance Committee respond to transnational terrorist incidents and the onset of the War on Terror by changing aid effort and aid allocation. First, an analy
Autor:
Robert T. Deacon
Publikováno v:
Deacon, Robert T.(2009). Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy. Public Choice, 139(1), pp 241-262. doi: 10.1007/s11127-008-9391-x. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/7f74s0nz
The allocation of a government budget between a public good and transfers is modeled under different systems of government. The relatively even distribution of political power among groups in a democracy favors spending on nonexclusive public goods.
Autor:
Axel Dreher
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 141(1-2):233-267
This article analyzes whether and to what extent reliance on conditionality is appropriate to guarantee the revolving character of the resources of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The paper presents theoretical arguments in favor of conditiona
Autor:
Thomas Schwartz
Publikováno v:
Schwartz, Thomas. (2010). Reply to Miller on agendas and sincerity. Public Choice, 145(3), pp 571-573. doi: 10.1007/s11127-010-9703-9. Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/5290x9dx
Contrary to Miller, Farquharson’s agenda trees do omit real parliamentary information. And the assumptions he uses to justify Farquharson’s definition of sincere (or naive) voting justify too little (e.g., he drops maximax) and rule out too much